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Abstract. The International Conference on the Teaching of Mathematical Modellino 
held at Exeter University, England in 1983 hiqhlighted the need and necessity for 
establishino a methodoloqy in mathematical modellinq. Central to this aim is the 
need for a deeper understanding of the cognitive aspects of the formulation staqe 
of the modelling process. This paper describes a maior project currently under way 
at the Polytechnic of the South Bank in London. 
The proiect aims to build interpretation models at the obiect and meta-levels and 
to refine these models from empirical data gathered from exoerts. This technique is 
beinq developed for commercial expert systems technoloqy and the author heiieves 
that this approach will provide valuable insight into the processes involved in 
formulation. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is interestinq to note that Prof. Burkhardt 
told the conference on Teaching Mathematical 
Modelling held at Exeter University, Enaland, in 
the Summer of 1983 that he considered "some 
modelling skill and understanding of the process- 
es involved are probably an important ingredient 
in teaching it successfully". (Burkhardt, 1984). 
At that time I considered that utterance a sound 
and valid statement. Today it appears almost 
prophetic; for mathematical modelling at least! 
It is imperative that the processes that underly 
formulation are better understood. Not only 
would practising modellers benefit from an 
established methodolooy, lmprovlno both their 
efficiency and effectiveness, but also teachers 
of mathematical modellino would at last have some 
theoretical basis for their methods of instruction. 
Methodologies of mathematical modelling tend to 
concentrate on taxonomies that describe the 
process as a whole and few if any give more than 
passinq reference to the formulation stage of the 
process. They may acknowledae that formulation 
is difficult, that it represents the 'bottleneck 
staqe of the process but little work has been 
done especially in this area to remove that 
hlockape. (Treilihs 1979, Oke lqR4, Hickman 
1985). The processes that are involved in the 
formulation staqe of mathematical modelling 
are undoubtably complex. They are closely 
related to the processes involved in what has 
become known as problem solving. Tney are 
however different in nature. This paper out- 
lines attempts to establish a methodoloqy usinq 
the techniques of artificial intelliaence and 
cognitive science to unravel1 these processes 
and thereby present a set of heuristics to be 
used by teachers, students and practitioners 
in their modelling activities. 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
This was how Allan Collins defined a new 
scientific discipline in 1975. Cognitive Science 
deals with the problem of building an intelligent 
machine that will simulate human conceotual 
mechanisms i.e. cognitive processes. Because 
mechanistic approaches based on tight logical 
systems are inadequate when extended to real-world 
tasks so the workers in artificial intelligence 
have tried to become much more psycholoaical. 
At the same time researchers in psychology have 
found it instructive to view humans as "informa- 
tion processors" and have therefore become 
interested in machine models of real-world 
knowledge. Thus cognitive science was born! 
The relevance of cognitive science to formulation 
in mathematical modelling is an obvious one. We 
have already mentioned that the characteristic of 
the formulation stage of the modellinq process 
is its complexity. The details of the dynamic 
heuristic processes that qovern formulation are 
enormously complicated. The computer is at 
least capable of handling some aspects of 
these details and computer simulation of the 
human activity can be very rewardinq and 
stimulatinq. 
What cognitive science is telling us is that 
humans process basic programmes. Each of us 
contains a vast supply of these programs and 
we have been developing them since birth. Piaaet 
calls simple proarams schemas and more complicated 
ones operations ILuria, called them functional 
systems Miller, Galanter and Pritram call them 
plans,?olrnan calls them cognitive maps, Bartlett 
schemes Cewin life spaces and Berne games. 
Whateve; they are called it is the task here 
to bring toqether those basic programs that will 
he necessary to formulate a mathematical model. 
The type and nature of the required proqrams IS 
obviously extremely complex but their number 
iS surprisingly small. We coniecture that 
(Farnham - Diggory 1972) basic human information 
processing needs the following:- 
a program for 
in the mind 
a program for 
a program for 
a proaram for 
information 
a program for 
information 
scanning and holdina information 
solving problems 
recalling information 
generating and classifyinq 
orderina and relating 
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and that these are applicable to the processes 
underlying formulation. 
Thus far we have suggested that cognitive science 
offers us the opportunity of understanding‘the 
actual processes that are involved in the formu- 
lation of mathematical models. The idea that 
human thinking can be simulated in this way 
through identifying 'cognitive programs' and 
'control strategies' is highly provocative. 
However, how do we establish the content of 
these programs? For example, if we wanted to 
produce a flowchart for a relationship or rule- 
discovering process that was part of the ordering 
and relating program, how would we go about it? 
One way is to build or attempt to build what has 
become known as an expert system, which would 
automatically utilise those features identified 
as useful by cognitive science. 
EXPERT SYSTEMS 
Let us define an expert system as follows:- 
LOGIC + CONTROL = ALGORITHM 
ALGORITHM + KNOWLEDGE = EXPERT SYSTEM 
In general an expert system consists of three 
major components: a knowledge base, an inference 
engine and a user interface. Here is not the 
place to discuss all of these in detail or to 
go into the problems associated with the 
implementation of such a system. It is however 
important to note that it is well accepted that 
a major problem in establishing the knowledge 
base of an expert system is that of knowledge 
elicitation - the process by which knowledge, 
both procedural and declarative, is extracted 
from an expert. 
Most expert systems are rule-based systems. This 
is because it is a common belief among 
researchers that most knowledge can be captured 
in rules. This is a misconception as systems 
like Centaur. (Aikins, 1983) have shown. One 
side effect of this misconception is that little 
research has been carried out in knowledge 
elicitation. The research that has been done 
suggests two main methods both of which use the 
services of the 'knowledge engineer'. The 
knowledge engineer can be thought of as the 
proiect manager acting as a mediator between the 
expert and the knowledge base. She/he need not 
be the programmer or gatherer of information but 
will supervise the tasks that are necessary for 
successful implementation. According to 
Feiqenbaum (Feigenbaum & McCorduck, 1983) the 
design task is characterised by rapid proto- 
typing. First the knowledge engineer gets 
acquainted with the nature and terminology of 
the domain by studying textbooks, manuals or 
other written material. Second the knowledge 
engineer interviews a domain expert and observes 
him/her solving realistic problems from the 
domain. The aim of these interviews is the 
selction of the appropriate tools for knowledge 
representation and inferencing and the gathering 
of the domain specific knowledge (laws and facts). 
A first prototype system is then brought up 
quickly and demonstrated to the expert. A 
subsequent incremental development of the SyStem 
follows. 
A different approach to the design problem has 
been proposed by Breuker and Wielinger in a 
series of reports that form the basis of an 
Esprit project developed in conjunction with the 
Knowledge-Based Systems Centre at the Polytechnic 
of the South Bank. (Breuker and Wielinger. 1983). 
This ambitious proiect aims at establishing a 
methodology for knowledge based system design, 
and the early reports deal with 'The Acquisition 
of Expertise'. The main proposal reqarding 
knowledge elicitation is that a greater degree of 
analysis of the domain is required before the 
elicitation process takes place. They suggest 
five levels of knowledge analysis. 
Knowledge identification: 
This level of analysis corresponds simply to 
recording what one or more experts report on 
their knowledge. 
Knowledge conceptualisation: 
Aims at the formulisation of knowledge in terms of 
knowledge in terms of conceptual relations, 
primitive concepts and conceptual models. The 
knowledge of different experts and possibly 
different subdomains is unified within one 
conceptual framework. 
Epistemological analysis: 
This analysis uncovers the structural properties 
of the conceptual knowledge, formalised in an 
epistemoloqical framework. 
Logical analysis: 
This level of analysis applies to the formalisms 
in which the meta-level knowledge is expressed 
and is responsible for inferencing. 
Implementational analysis: 
This is an analysis of the control strategies, i.e 
the mechanism on which the higher levels of 
knowledge are based. 
Breuker and Wielinger's point is that traditional 
expert system design (Feigenbaum's) map from 
the first level to the fifth level. They suggest 
that there is an intermediate stage that will 
improve the authenticity of system design. 
This intermediate stage rests on the design of 
so called 'interpretation models'. An 
interpretation model consists of a typology of 
basic elements, structuring relations and a 
representation of the inference structure for 
a class of domains. The elements of the 
model are canonical, i.e they are abstractions 
of the elements that constitute the knowledge in 
a specific domain. A classification of canonical 
elements has been qiven by Wielinqa (Wielinqa and 
Breuker 1984). but-importantly are not _ 
appropriate for mathematical modelling. The 
interpretation model represents a top down 
approach to the analysis of verbal data. By 
some technique, structured interview, thinkino 
aloud procedures etc., data is aathered from the 
expert and matched against the interpretation 
model; the model is tested and debupqed by the 
'empirical data'. It is argued that the more 
elaborate and explicit the interpretation model 
is from the start, the more efficient the analys 
can proceed. 
.is 
Neither of these approaches are feasible in a 
domain as complex as formulation in mathematical 
modelling. How can a knowledge engineer get 
acquainted with the nature and terminology of 
formulation? l'lere are no textbooks, manuals 
and very few research papers fOke, 1984, Treilibs, 
19791. The non-domain expert knowledae engineer 
has even less of a chance of designing a 
satisfactory interpretation model. What is re- 
quired is a synthesis ofthe two methods, i.e a 
top down approach (interpretation models1 and a 
bottom up approach (rapid prototyping). The 
only way that this can be feasible in the domain 
of mathematical modelling is that an expert 
modeller plays the role of the knowledge engineer. 
eliciting ltnowledge from other experts. The 
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whole exercise is made more tractable ifl that 
interpretation models can be constructed by the 
expert from his own knowledge having pre- 
determined the knowledge representation. This 
pre-determination will siqnificantly simplify . . 
the recognition of the knowledge sources* 
specific to that domain and with the advent of 
modern object oriented proqramning environments 
is not as restrictive as used to be the case. 
This latter point is important since if we are 
to also use rapid prototypinq to fine-tune tCe 
model a knowledge representation that best 
'caotures' the expert's knowledge and is also 
flexible and adaptable in almost a pre-requisite. 
Ob,iect-oriented environments support this 
flexible approacbe. To illustrate the point 
let us analyse the followinq piece of information 
elicited from an expert modeller. 
A problem that can be modelled by 
the class of models known as time- 
dependent models often exhibit the 
features that variables can be 
related to inputs that cause 
increase and outputs that cause 
decrease. Other models are also 
time dependent but some exhibit 
the additional feature that there 
is a delaying factor. 
* A knowledge source is a piece of knowledge 
that derives new information from existing data 
(Clancey. 19R3). 
If we now make the assumption that this 
knowledge can be orqanised as a set of laws and 
facts, we can analyse the ltnowledge as follows:- 
A : 
B : 
c : 
x : 
Y : 
z : 
Laws: 
L, : 
L2 : 
L3 : 
Facts: 
F1 : 
F2 : 
F3 : 
time-dependent models 
time-dependent models with delay 
discrete time-dependent models (say) 
input feature 
output feature 
time delay feature 
any model A exhibits features X 
any model B exhibits feature Z 
a specification of a model t,vDe 
inherits the features of that 
category. 
B is a specialisation of A 
C is a specialisation of A 
A is a model category for 6 and 
and Y 
C. 
In AI terminology the laws Ll and L2 represent 
declarative knowledge and the law L2 represents 
procedual knowledge. The procedual knowledge 
dictates the conceptual structure of the 
declarative knowledge. For example, according 
to some procedural knowledge component 
certain facts should he clustered together and 
manipulated as a sinqle entry. This body of 
knowledge can now be encoded in terms of rules. 
The deductive relationships involved are as 
follows:- 
Cl1 : model is of type A 
exhibits features X, and Y. 
D2 : model is of type B 
exhibits features X. Y and Z. 
RI: if the problem exhibits feature X and - 
the problem exhibits features Y, 
then we mav conclude that the lilte1.v 
model is of type A, 
R2: if the problem exhibits feature X and - - 
the prohlem exhibits feature Y and - 
the problem exhibits feature Z, 
then we may conclude that the likely 
model is of type 8. 
Since the first two clauses of the antecendent of 
rule R2 the consequent of rule Rl, R2 may be 
re-expressed as; 
R2 : if the model isof type A and 
the problem exhibits the feature Z, 
then we may conclude that the likely 
model is of type B. 
The knowledge is encoded in this form precisely to 
infer hypotheses rather than to represent 
deductive relationships, i.e if the antecendent 
of Rl is satisfied (i.e tCe problem exhibits the 
feature of input and output variables) then we 
may infer that we can probably use a time- 
dependent model. It should be noted that since 
the knowledge itself embodies uncertainties, the 
conculsion will be qualified by a degree of 
confidence (itself inferred from perhaps Bayesian 
probabilities or the expert himself). Rules such 
as Rl and R2 encode knowledge that is suitable 
for inference and in this way the system can be 
made to answer How? or Why? questions simply by 
displayinq the rules. 
Other rules which do not constitute reversions but 
could also he included in the knowledae are:- 
R3 : if the model is of type A and 
the problem does not exhibit 
feature Z. 
then we may conclude that the problem is 
not ljkely to be described by 
model 8. 
R4 : if the model is of type A and not of 
type B, 
then we may conclude that the problem 
could he described by model C. 
R5 : if tile model is of type A and the 
model is not of type C, - 
then we may conclude t4at the problem 
could be described by model 6. 
One of the defects of such a system is teat the 
taxonomy of models (Facts Fl, F2, F31 are not 
explicitly represented through the rules. 
However, there is an implicit representation in 
that "the model is of type A" is in the antecedent 
of each rule and that model types B and C are 
mutally exclusive. We can see, for example, that 
the rule R2 is the reversion of the deductive 
relation 02; D2 in turn reoresents the law L2 and 
the application of the law l-3 to law Cl and facts 
Fl and F3. Thus it is often the case that it is 
difficult for these so called oroduction s.ystems 
to capture all the knowledge, i.e they are not 
flexible enouph. There are fortunately other 
representations that can be used. An important 
area of development in expert system is the 
'obiect oriented' or frame style of representing 
concepts as structured collections of inter- 
related facts and rules. 
The formalism was firs% introduced by Minsky 
(Minsky. 1975) although the actual concept can 
he traced back to Bartlett (Bartlett, 1932). A 
frame is a data-structure consisting of a network 
of nodes and relations used for representlno a 
stereo-typical situation. Minksy uses the example 
of a hirthday party to illustrate the idea:- 
The knowledge is represented in rule form as a 
reversion of these deductive relationships:- 
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Jane was invited to Jack's birthday 
party, she wondered if he would 
like a kite. She went to her room 
and shook her pigqy bank, it made 
no sound. 
: 
Most readers would interpret this story to mean 
that Jane wants money to buy Jack a present, hut 
there is no money in her piqpy bank. Minsky 
and other researchers such as Schank (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977) suggest that this response is 
surprising in that the words 'present' and 
'money' do not appear in the story, but the 
connection has been made nonetheless. They 
would explain this by saying; something early 
in the story, as seen, triagered the retrieval 
of the 'birthday frame' from lonq-term memory 
which has a slot in it for 'present' as a 
default assignment (something that may well be 
expected at a birthday partyl. The same 
reasoning applies to the piggy bank frame with 
the slot, 'money'. In this way, Minsky argues, 
inference take place. 
Attached to any frame is information about how 
to use that frame, what to expect to happen and 
what other frames might be related and under what 
conditions. 
The importance of the conception lies in the fact 
that it allows the co-existence of the 
declarative knowledge representing some 
situation and the procedural knowledpe that 
controls it. It. does this because a frame 
contains a larae body of richly inter- 
connected information about a single topic 
organised around typical observations and 
procedures (in the opinion of the expert!). 
The top levels of a frame are fixed, and 
represent things that are always true about 
the supposed situation. The lower levels 
have many terminals called clots that must 
be filled by specif;c instances o; data. Each 
terminal can specify conditions its assignments 
must meet (in fact the assignments themselves 
are usually smaller subframes). The slots are 
initially filled with default assiqnments 
containing information that hold unless new 
information displaces them. In terms of 
coqnitive processing, Minsky conjectured that 
frames were never stored in long-term memory 
with unassipned terminal values, usually they 
contain weakly hound default assignments 
(such as 'present' above). As we react with 
our environment so we call up these frames from 
lonq-term memory and modify the default 
assignments for a particular situation, i.e the 
frames are closely related to our notion of 
basic human programs or heuristics. 
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Aqain, to illustrate the idea, althouqh it does 
not do it justice, the frame representation of 
our modelling example is given above. 
Pf2OTOlYP!I 
SLOTS VALE 
A a 
B b _C 
c-c SLors VALUIS 
C-D X x 
WE Y Y 
i 
lEFwpKxFfLLE 
RUES LIST 
The frame representation scheme captures the 
given conceptual structure and the taxonomy of 
models is represented throuqh the 'specialisation' 
and 'type' slots and the empirical associations 
between features and models throuqht the 'features' 
slots. Thus all the laws and facts are explicitly 
represented. It is most important to note that 
these frame representations are not limited to 
classification hierarchies hut can represent other 
aspects of knowledge. "Part of" hierarchies 
can describe the frames which are components of 
other frames and so on, as above, Importantly 
for mathematical modelling, frames can he more 
abstract in that they can be used to represent 
meta-knowledge, i.e knowledge ahout knowledge, 
Systems with meta-knowledqe can stand back and 
critically consider the different techniques 
available to them in solving a problem. The 
ma.ior step in applying these ideas is to regard 
all the concepts introduced so far, facts, laws, 
rules, decisions, control mechanisms as ob,iects 
themselves, i.e frames and consequently they can 
appear in frames themselves. However, Minsky has 
not made it exolicitly clear how frame based 
systems can infer and it is a feature of modern 
approaches that frame oriented representation are 
reparded as being most suitable for representing 
facts and data-declarative parts of the knowledqe. 
The procedural parts - the parts that control the 
processes of symbol manipulation (in this case the 
basic symbol beinq a frame itself) - are usually 
dealt with separately. We have already seen that 
a most convenient way of representing procedural 
knowledge is through a rule. Rules can be stored 
within object frames and are used when inferences 
about an oh,iect or set of obiects are required. 
An example taken from Aikins (Aikins, lqE3) to 
illustrates this point and is shown above. 
In this system called Centaur the frames are 
called Prototypes because they represent typical 
situations which can be used as a basis for 
comparison to the actual situation given by the 
data. Centaur is a consultation system 
concerned with diagnosing pulmonary disease. Its 
importance here lies not in the fact that it is 
a consultant but that its method of knowledge 
representation separates those rules that are, 
for example, written to control the invocation of 
other rules, to set default values, or to 
summarize data from those rules used to infer new 
information. The control knowledge is represented 
within each prototype, thus, allowing context - 
specific control, and separation from other 
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knowledge in the system. Ouite rightly Centaur 
claims as one of its virtues that it represents 
its knowledge explicitly. Rule-based systems, 
as we have noted, represent their knowledge 
implicitly. The rule format represents not only 
procedural knowledge, but also declarative 
knowledge and control knowledge within a 
prototype. If one if using such a system to 
explain expert performance then there is a 
significant advantage in Centaur's approach in 
that experts can specify a different set of 
control tasks for each prototypical situation. 
In mathematical modelling, the formulation stage 
of the modelling process often calls for the 
recall of prototypical situations. When I 
was modelling the rolling resistance of a 
pneumatic tyre on a road, (Hickman, 1985) I 
was immediately drawn to the calssical prototype 
model that deals with Coulomb friction. This 
behaviour is typical of the professional modeller 
particularly where expediency calls for the use 
of standard techniques, which is very often 
the case in commercial or industrial environments. 
The actual formulation and refinement of the 
model can then take place through the slots 
of the chosen frame. Where necessary other 
prototypes may be called up so that the 
familiar 'stagnation period' is avoided or at 
least kept to a minimum. There is no doubt that 
closer examination of the Centaur system will be 
productive. 
The object of the exercise is to establish an 
interpretation framework at the epistemological 
level. In a domain as comples as mathematical 
modelling simply interviewing and then building 
will ,iust not be practicable, equally building 
an interpretation model from scratch where 
textual knowledge may be minimal and a generic 
model not available would also prove difficult. 
It is suggested that in such domains the only 
way to establish such a framework is through 
the processes as discussed. 
CONCLUSION 
The methodologies that exist for building 
expert systems give us an opportunity to 
establish a methodology of formulation in a 
pragmatic and practical way. This paper argued 
not for the implementation of an expert system 
in mathematical modelling, (though wouldn't 
that be a desirable thing?) but that the 
thought that goes into the design of such a 
system can give us the heuristics that would form 
the basis of a strategy for formulation in 
mathematical modelling. A proiect designed to 
implement this arqument is already underway, 
and has put great emphasis on the use of 
interpretation models. (Ha Kong, Hickman, 1985). 
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